The ethics of interpretation : The signifying chain from field to analysis by Lapping, C
 1 
The ethics of interpretation: the signifying chain from field to analysis 
 
(Forthcoming in Discourse 29(1), which will be published in March 2008) 
 
Claudia Lapping 
Institute of Education 
20 Bedford Way 
London WC1H OAL 
 
e-mail: c.lapping@ioe.ac.uk 
 
 
Claudia Lapping completed her PhD in 2004, at the Institute of Education, 
University of London, where she is currently working as a lecturer in Education. 
 2 
The ethics of interpretation: the signifying chain from field to analysis 
 
 
Abstract: This paper attempts to describe the relationship between the embodied 
practice of fieldwork and the written articulation of this experience. Starting from 
Valerie Hey‟s conceptualisation of „rapport‟ as form of „intersubjective synergy‟, a 
moment of recognition of similarity within difference – similar in structure to 
Laclau and Moufffe‟s conceptualization of hegemony – the paper explores how 
we can understand these moments of recognition as positioned within a complex 
web of signifying chains that interlink social, psychic and linguistic means of 
representation. Laclau and Mouffe‟s logics of equivalence and difference and 
Lacan‟s account of the production of meaning through metaphor and metonymy 
provide a theoretical language through which to explore chains of meaning in two 
fragments of data drawn from a study comparing disciplines and institutions in 
higher education. My argument is that an awareness of these processes of 
production of meaning is necessary to the development of an ethical mode of 
interpretation.  
 
Key words: metaphor, metonymy, chain of signifiers, contingency, hegemony, 
„rapport‟  
 
 
From ‘rapport’ to hegemony 
This paper intertwines three strands of argument: an interpretation of my 
positioning within interactions with one of my research participants, a theoretical 
argument about the production of meaning, and, following from this, an 
articulation of what it might mean to take an ethical position as a researcher. The 
paper was initially written in response to a very specific anxiety concerning the 
effects of my research on Duncan1, one of the tutors who participated in my 
study. I felt there had been moments within the research relationship when 
ambiguities in my position, and my clumsiness in dealing with these ambiguities, 
had allowed misunderstandings to develop about the nature of the research and 
the way in which I would analyse Duncan‟s practice. I was also anxious about our 
final communication, which had left unanswered questions about his response to 
sections of the analysis that I had sent him2.  Eventually, I selected two 
fragments of interaction between myself and Duncan to analyse in relation to the 
ethics of the research relationship. I situated my interpretation of these extract 
within a broader theoretical understanding of the discursive mechanisms that 
constitute inter-subjective relations between researcher and researched. This 
paper, then, was written in an attempt to come to terms with some unsettled 
feelings about my research practice. To do this, it constructs a theoretical 
framework that begins to articulate an ethics of interpretation that clarifies the 
position of the researcher in relation to research participants, analysis, and 
writing.  
  
                                                 
1
 Not his real name. 
2
 An account of the final communication between Duncan and myself is presented in an addendum to the 
paper. 
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There is, I think, a useful distinction to be made between my initial response to 
my anxiety and my later theorization of my position. My initial concerns were 
about methods: what I should or shouldn‟t have said to my participants at various 
stages of the research. These concerns correlate with recent discussions in the 
research methods literature articulating the ethical complexities of „rapport‟ and 
„informed consent‟ (Duncombe and Jessop, 2002, Finch 1984, Birch and Miller, 
2002).  However, such discussions tend to be contextualized within specific 
research projects and do not address broader theoretical questions about the 
objectifying and political potentials of research, and how these may have 
connotations for the construction of an ethical position within fieldwork and 
analysis. In writing this paper I wanted to move beyond a focus on „methods‟ to 
develop a more abstracted conceptualization of ethical relations. This shift was 
mediated in part through the work of Valerie Hey.  
 
Hey has articulated her theorisation of the politics of research through a 
reconceptualisation of „rapport‟ as „a momentarily achieved (fragile) form of inter-
subjective synergy that is produced with and against the force of the binary 
norms that marshal us into our respective places‟ (2000, p. 165). Arguing against 
criticisms of the concept that assume „rapport‟ connotes a naïve or mystical 
authentic connection, Hey suggests that there is a need to recognize „the psychic 
economy of „rapport‟‟, not as a „guarantor of truth‟, but as a proper theorization of 
the embodied experience of participating in fieldwork (ibid, p. 173). For me, Hey‟s 
work provided a theoretical link from relatively limited methodological accounts of 
„rapport‟ to theoretical conceptualisations of hegemony and the discursive 
production of subjectivity. Her work also constitutes an instance of written 
ethnography that contrasts in significant ways with the accounts of data in my 
own writing.  
 
Hey develops her argument through an autobiographical account of her 
relationship to the working class and middle class young women who were her 
research participants in her study of girls‟ friendships (see Hey, 1997). The use of 
autobiography allows Hey to codify the moments of similarity and difference that 
constituted her relationship with these young women: she recognized, from her 
own childhood, the discourses of respectability that positioned her working class 
participants in relation to both school and domesticity, but their contrasting 
responses to these discourses had enacted different aspirations. While Hey had 
imagined escape through education, her participants‟ fantasies foregrounded 
their sexuality as a means of release from the constraints of their current 
position. Hey disentangles these aspects of her identification with her 
participants, explaining: 
 
I have never felt the force field of research relations as singular monolithic states 
of „rapport‟/‟difference‟. (p. 163) 
 
Understood in this way, „rapport‟ requires delicate analysis of the context of the 
researcher‟s changing and unstable identifications with participants, and their 
developing understanding of the research setting. It should also be understood, 
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as Hey suggests, as uneven, transitory and fragile, offering no lasting or certain 
answers to difficult questions of interpretation.  Thus the question facing an 
ethical researcher is no longer about how or whether we might be able to 
establish „rapport‟, nor about whether „rapport‟, once established, either 
recognizes or exploits marginal subjectivities, but rather about the way in which a 
more nuanced understanding of the different textures and intensities of the 
research relationship might contribute to our understanding of both the 
objectifying and the political potentials of research.  
 
My argument in this paper concerns these potentials of research, the way the 
process of analysis articulates and fixes the meaning of ambiguous and transient 
moments within the research relationship, and the ongoing political and ethical 
effects of these articulated meanings. The question Valerie Hey raises is whether 
the process of interpretation can codify and stabilize these significations to form 
the basis of a politically engaged research practice. She argues: 
 
my metaphor for „rapport‟ compares it to the sought after hegemony of political 
alliances – the temporary contract between people that holds both sameness and 
difference in play and thus allows for action and representation (p. 176). 
 
This metaphor can be reframed in the language of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe‟s account of hegemony and articulatory processes (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001). 
 
Hegemony:  the articulation of equivalence within difference  
In their preface to the second edition of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau 
and Mouffe describe their work as an attempt to close „an increasing gap 
between the realities of contemporary capitalism and what Marxism could 
legitimately subsume under its own categories‟ (2001, p. viii). Their strategy for 
achieving this, they suggest, is to „reactivate‟ Marxist theory by drawing attention 
to the contingency of the original concepts and raising questions about the 
continuities and discontinuities between the context in which the theory was 
developed and new problems raised in the development of contemporary 
capitalism (p. viii-ix). As they point out, this change in the context and categories 
of analysis „leads also to a new ontological paradigm‟ (ibid, p. x) constituted in 
their account of articulatory processes. Their theory of articulation, then, is 
formulated to express the contingency of discursive structures and draws 
explicitly on Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, which points to a lack in the 
structure of language. The basis of this lack, for Lacan, is the relationship 
between the real and symbolic orders. The Lacanian real, that which is beyond 
language, can never be (fully) represented within the discursive structures of the 
symbolic order. Articulation, then, is opposed to mediation, which, for Laclau and 
Mouffe, suggests a direct or necessary link between a transcendent totality and 
symbolized social organization. In contrast to this direct representation, an 
articulatory practice modifies the elements of the real within contingently 
organized discursive structures. Since the real can never be fully represented, 
the articulatory process is always incomplete: there are always gaps within 
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discursive structures. These gaps are the space of politics, or the potential for 
change in social relations.  
 
Laclau and Mouffe‟s central category for political analysis, the concept of 
hegemony, can be used to describe the emergence of individual interpretations 
and their role in unifying and (partially) fixing meanings in relation to a signifying 
system, in a way that is analogous to Hey‟s account of „rapport‟. This is, for me, 
most clearly explained by Laclau in Emancipations, when he describes the 
function of hegemony in establishing a link between a dispersed set of 
differentiated demands: 
 
The meaning (the signified) of all concrete struggles appears, right from the 
beginning, internally divided. The concrete aim of the struggle is not only that aim 
in its concreteness; it also signifies opposition to the system. The first signified 
establishes the differential character of that demand or mobilization vis-à-vis all 
other demands or mobilizations. The second signified establishes the 
equivalence of all these demands in their common opposition to the system. As 
we can see, any concrete struggle is dominated by this contradictory movement 
that simultaneously asserts and abolishes its own singularity. (Laclau, 1996, p. 
41) 
 
Laclau thus suggests that what is signified in any moment of articulation always 
has two aspects, one that relates to the particular instance of experience, and 
one that expresses how differing instances share a relationship of opposition to 
an existing linguistic or symbolic system. Valerie Hey‟s example of the 
ambiguities of „rapport‟ within her research can be used to illustrate this dual role 
of the signifier as bringing together signifieds as same but different. What Laclau 
describes as „the first signified‟, refers to the concrete differences between any 
two struggles. In Hey‟s example this is instantiated in the differences between 
her experience of working class girlhood and that of her participants. While Hey 
sought to achieve the fantasy of respectability through studious, desexualized 
educational success, her participants sought the same end through alternative 
means: Hey describes how „Carol‟ represents herself as a heroine of 
heterosexual romance (2000, p. 166). While the „first signified‟ articulates this 
difference in their experience, the „second signified‟ „establishes the equivalence 
of all these demands in their common opposition to the system‟. What Hey‟s 
research articulates is a commonality in the dispersed experiences of working 
class young women that is their relation to a hegemonic discourse of 
respectability. However, there are two different moments of articulation of this 
commonality: the first is the embodied, empathetic understanding itself, that may 
remain scarcely more than a transiently recognized, inchoate experience; the 
second is the fuller articulation of this moment within Hey‟s writing, which both 
transforms the experience, and constitutes its signifying position within the 
symbolic practices of educational research literature. 
 
These two different moments, one a partial recognition and one a more explicit 
articulation, can also be described in terms of Laclau and Mouffe‟s distinction 
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between floating signifiers and (partially) fixed or hegemonic signifiers. Laclau 
describes a floating signifier as ambiguous to the extent that „either an 
overdetermination or an underdetermination of signifieds prevents it from being 
fully fixed‟ (1996, p. 36). The concept of a floating signifier thus foregrounds the 
incomplete aspect to any articulation of meaning. The concept of fixed or 
hegemonic signifiers, in contrast, foregrounds the political effectivity of 
signification: 
 
Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to 
arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre. We will call the privileged 
discursive points of this partial fixation, nodal points. (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 
p. 112) 
 
Nodal points, „privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a signifying chain‟ (ibid, 
p. 112), not only establish equivalences between dispersed demands, or 
experiences, but also organize relations between signifiers within the discursive 
field around this equivalence.  
 
The unarticulated, or barely articulated recognition of „rapport‟ within the 
embodied practice of fieldwork constitutes, perhaps, a radically underdetermined 
floating signifier. The written articulation of this experience is a move towards the 
partial fixing of meaning in order to reorganize the existing discursive field. This 
paper is an attempt to describe this transformation of embodied, inchoate 
experience, by identifying some of the processes of production of meaning in the 
development of the analysis. These process, I will suggest, can be described in 
terms of a Lacanian understanding of metaphor and metonymy as the two „sides‟ 
through which the signifier produces the signified (Lacan, 1989, p. 177), or, 
alternatively, in Laclau and Mouffe‟s reworking of these concepts in their account 
of the logics of equivalence and difference. There are also similarities between 
this work and Walkerdine‟s use of the concept of metaphor to describe the way 
children establish and move between discursive contexts in primary classrooms 
(1982, 1988). Walkerdine suggests the way in which the metaphorical aspect of 
mathematical language gains mastery through the suppression of the personal 
features of the subject (1988, p. 186). What I am describing here is the way in 
which academic analyses, and the production of meanings more generally, enact 
similar suppressions, excluding important specificities embedded within the 
experience of the field.  
 
Metaphor and metonymy as constitutive of the signifying chain 
It might be possible to think of the embedded experience of the field as the 
(lacanian) real and the process of transcription and analysis as a means of 
symbolising and simultaneously excluding aspects of the real. Alternatively, you 
might see the interactions in the field as an already symbolic representation of 
the unconscious of researcher and participants. Either way, there is a symbolic 
chain that links the diverse levels of unconscious, field and analysis. This chain 
can be described as working through the mechanisms of metaphor and 
metonymy.  
 7 
 
Metaphor and metonymy in their linguistic sense can, perhaps, be relatively 
simply defined. While metonymy is based on a relationship of contiguity, the word 
for a part used to represent a whole („sail‟ for „ship‟, „throne‟ for „kingdom‟), 
metaphor constitutes a relationship of association through the substitution of one 
word for another. Even in their „purely‟ linguistic sense, though, the distinction 
between the two may not always be unproblematic (metonym can be thought of 
as a particular type of metaphor) so when the terms are used to describe 
relations that move beyond the „purely‟ linguistic the notion of a direct translation 
is not necessarily productive.  Lacan‟s use of metaphor and metonymy to 
reconceptualise Freud‟s account of the production of meaning in the dream-work 
through the mechanisms of condensation and displacement is also an indirect 
translation of the terms, as Lacan suggests: 
 
What distinguishes these two mechanisms, which play such a privileged role in 
the dream-work, from their homologous function in discourse? Nothing, except a 
condition imposed upon the signifying material, called Rucksicht auf 
Darstellbarkeit, which must be translated by „consideration of the means of 
representation‟. (Lacan, 1989, p. 177) 
 
The „means of representation‟ in a dream are not simply words (see Ragland- 
Sullivan, 1986, p. 235), and so the interpretation of individual instances of images 
that work to condense or displace meaning within dreams as either metaphor or 
metonym, and the ensuing development of these concepts, will depend on the 
interpretive framework of the theorist (see, for example, Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 59, 
on Jakobson and Lacan‟s contrasting interpretations).  What Lacan‟s 
recontextualisation suggests is the potential productivity of the structure of 
metaphor and metonymy for understanding the production of meaning through 
various means of representation.  
 
The relation Lacan is constructing through his reconceptualisation of the 
dreamwork is one that foregrounds both the link between the unconscious and 
language, and, as in his famous formulation, the language-like structuring of the 
unconscious.  He does this by identifying the ways in which mechanisms that are 
analogous to metaphor and metonymy link manifest and latent dream content, 
conscious and unconscious, through the processes of condensation and 
displacement (Lacan, 1989, Ragland-Sullivan, 1986). As Ragland-Sullivan puts 
it: 
 
Although metaphor does, indeed, emerge from two signifiers (in Lacan‟s sense), 
this occurs within a signifying chain. One signifier is substituted in a Saussurean 
chain of signs, but the word or image substituted does not merely disappear on 
being transformed. It remains present (repressed or signified) by its metonymic 
connection to the chain of meaning itself … The supplanted signifier, in other 
words, falls from the level of consciousness to the level of unconsciousness, 
where it acts as a kind of latent unconscious signifier grafted onto an 
unconscious chain of associations. (ibid, p. 234) 
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Thus, Lacan suggests not only that metaphor and metonymy offer useful 
structures for describing the production of meaning, but also that these structures 
can help us to understand the way meanings are constituted across different 
levels or „means‟ of representation. This can then be translated to construct a 
description of the way substitutions are made in our analysis of field data, which 
replicates the way a „supplanted signifier‟ from the field may, adapting Ragland-
Sullivan‟s phrase, „fall from the level of analysis to the level of the field‟.  
 
A similar translation of the mechanisms of metaphor and metonymy is articulated 
in Laclau and Mouffe‟s logics of difference and of equivalence. It should already 
be apparent that hegemony, the articulation of equivalence within difference, has 
the structure of metonymy: the equivalence thus articulated takes a part to 
represent a whole.  The distinction they make between the logics of difference 
and equivalence, though, constitutes a refinement of this structure that parallels 
Lacan‟s contrast between metonymic connections and metaphorical 
substitutions. For Laclau and Mouffe, the metonymic structure allows the social 
space to support differences, while the break brought about through metaphorical 
substitution enforces an equivalence that eliminates the differential features of an 
object: 
 
If all the differential features of an object have become equivalent, it is impossible 
to express anything positive concerning that object; this can only imply that 
through the equivalence something is expressed which the object is not … 
Hence the ambiguity penetrating every relation of equivalence: two terms, to be 
equivalent, must be different – otherwise, there would be a simple identity. On 
the other hand, the equivalence exists only through the act of subverting the 
differential character of those terms. (2001, p. 128) 
 
The metaphorical substitution, as suggested by Lacan, forces the individualizing 
features of the substituted object outside the system. But, as Gasche points out, 
this excluded signifier remains within the system to the extent that it is signified 
as that which the system is not: 
 
The logic of equivalence thus leads to the formation of signifieds that imply the 
system as a whole, and that, paradoxically, signify (indirectly, negatively) the 
excluded outside or the beyond of the system. (2004, p. 25) 
 
Laclau and Mouffe‟s categories, it seems to me, retain fluidity in the distinction 
between metonymy and metaphor, difference and equivalence. The logic of 
difference foregrounds a similarity within identities, without excluding the 
positivity of those identities from the system.  The logic of equivalence performs a 
more radical substitution, in which, as Laclau suggests, difference is „almost 
entirely‟ eradicated: 
 
It is only by privileging the dimension of equivalence to the point that its 
differential nature is almost entirely obliterated – that is emptying it of its 
differential nature – that the system can signify itself as a totality. (Laclau, 1996, 
p. 39) 
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What Laclau‟s „almost entirely‟ retains is a sense of the openness of the system, 
which is also relevant to my consideration of the ethics of interpretation. The 
questions I am asking in the following sections relate to this possibility of 
openness. To what extent does my analysis constitute an obliteration of 
specificities and differences that inhere in my data? To what extent do we 
attempt to constitute argument as a coherent totality that excludes difference? 
And in what ways may we able to maintain the openness of the system within our 
interpretations? Whilst always remembering that the purpose of analysis is also 
to „arrest the flow of differences‟ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 112), to construct 
and attempt to fix new fields of meaning.  
 
Fragment 1: ‘rapport’ as the articulation of equivalence within difference 
The extracts I am using are taken from my PhD research which explored the 
positioning of students on undergraduate courses. The analysis developed a 
description of student positions as constituted in relation to the discipline they 
were studying, the institution in which they were studying, and hegemonic codes 
of masculinity and femininity (see Lapping, 2004, 2005). Each of these discursive 
fields was conceputalised as an incomplete identity that then had to be 
objectified within the analysis. The data that formed the basis of this 
objectification were a combination of classroom observations and interviews: I 
participated in a series of sessions on two modules in American Literature and 
two in Political Thought, videoed the classes, and interviewed students and tutors 
about the discussions that I had observed. Duncan was one of the American 
Literature tutors whose classes I observed. 
 
In preparation for my interview with Duncan I had carried out a preliminary 
analysis of the transcripts and identified extracts for us to discuss. One significant 
aspect of this process was the development of an explicit objectification of the 
disciplines. So, one of the purposes of discussing extracts from the transcripts 
with Duncan was to clarify and perhaps confirm my initial analysis of the nature 
of his subject, and of literary studies more broadly.  
 
Contemporary literary studies is a multi-methodological field that incorporates 
historical and sociological approaches as well as the close textual analysis more 
traditionally associated with the discipline.  I was interested in identifying the way 
in which complex readings that combined these approaches and readings that 
presented relatively simplistic deployments of sociological categories were both 
legitimized strategies for doing literary studies within the classroom. For example, 
in analyzing the presentation of „race‟ within a text, some students would refer to 
metaphorical implications of language and plotting and the relationship between 
these textual features, while others would start from the assumption that the 
repetition of stereotypes is wrong, and use the identification of stereotypes to 
develop a political critique of an author and/or text. Both American Literature 
tutors in the study tended to respond to the less textualised readings by offering 
prompts, or questions encouraging students to develop a more reflective 
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approach to the text. However, in the North University session on „Benito 
Cereno‟, a disturbing story by Herman Melville that explicitly deploys dangerous, 
racialised imagery in order to evoke a racist ideology, Duncan, the tutor, had 
presented two possible readings, correlating to the two approaches described 
above. This contrasted with his position in the session on Moby Dick, which he 
had presented as a less ambiguous example of an anti-slavery or anti-racist text.  
 
In the interview I showed Duncan an extract from the session on Moby Dick 
where one student, Dean, had suggested that the association of savagery with a 
Polynesian character, Queequeg, within the book undermined its progressive 
intentions. Another student had responded by referring to examples of savagery 
in the white characters in the novel, arguing that the depiction of the relationship 
between „race‟ and savagery was more complex than Dean was suggesting. 
Duncan‟s initial response to the extract was that „Dean is saying something that‟s 
a bit crude, I think, about savagery and how that links to violence‟. He 
commented that the second student „says something that‟s much more like 
something that I would say, and moves the conversation onto another level‟.  
 
At this point I introduced my observation that his interpretation of Melville had 
seemed much more ambiguous in the session on „Benito Cereno‟ than in the 
session on Moby Dick. Duncan acknowledged my point, and then talked about 
the implications it might have for his reading of the novel: 
 
CL: What about, there‟s a similar type of discussion that happens in the „Benito 
Cereno‟ session where you get one of the students, Jonathan, I think, picking out 
the sort of, what could be seen as racist imagery around the animalization of 
black women, and there were two readings again. And you were actually kind of, 
I thought, trying to maintain the ambiguity. And it‟s less so here. Do you think that 
Dean here is in the sort of Jonathan sort of position. He‟s reading it in this kind of 
„is this text racist‟ kind of way. 
 
 Duncan: Maybe. 
 
 CL: Which you were slightly more open to in terms of Benito Cereno than here. 
 
Duncan: That‟s probably right. I‟m glad you said that because I hadn‟t thought 
about that, but immediately I think it‟s right, that I was teaching Moby Dick in a 
more utopian way, whereas I might be rather more sensible in thinking that 
Benito Cereno was actually contaminated by the same racial thinking that it 
critiques … I think a more nuanced reading of Moby Dick is one that says, yes, 
as well as critiquing racial thinking it does implement racial thinking, and I‟m sure 
that‟s closer to the sort of ultimate position one might want to have about the text 
than saying that this is Melville in a very prescient way deconstructing racial 
thinking, because I don‟t think that‟s the case.  
 
Embedded within the moment of fieldwork, I experienced Duncan‟s response as 
a gratifying recognition of my perceptive analysis of his practice. His words are 
explicitly affirming „I‟m glad you said that‟, and he then goes on to incorporate my 
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observation into his own interpretation, suggesting „a more nuanced reading of 
Moby Dick is one that says, yes, as well as critiquing racial thinking it does 
implement racial thinking‟.  This interpretation depends on, recognizes and 
incorporates my words, and thus momentarily unifies our positions. However, 
interpreted in relation to a conception of „rapport‟ as an articulation of 
equivalence within difference, what is going on is more complex. While it is 
certainly the case that a particular understanding is articulated between us in this 
exchange, this same shared interpretation in fact belongs to two very different 
interpretive frames: I was interested in a sociological objectification of literary 
studies while Duncan was interested in a nuanced critical reading of Moby Dick. 
Nevertheless, these contrasting interests are articulated through the same 
recognition of the significance of Duncan‟s two different presentations of Melville.  
 
What we have here, in extreme microcosm, is the articulation of a hegemony that 
unifies our separate interests under one signifier. This interpretation, again, has 
analogies to Hey‟s account of her „rapport‟ with her young working class 
participants. In both cases there is a truth to the moment of „rapport‟, which 
expresses a shared signifying position in relation to a symbolic system, and in 
both cases this shared signifying position has potential effects, either within or 
beyond the research process.   
 
However, we can be more precise about some of these effects.  This signifying 
moment constitutes a link in at least two distinct signifying chains. There is, 
firstly, the constitution of the meaning of our relationship, the relationship 
between researcher and researched. Our shared interpretation pervades our 
relationship during my research, such that we will, perhaps, continue to feel a 
sense of joint, collaborative enterprise and to assume some common 
understanding as to my purposes and possible analysis. This set of meanings 
has ethical implications in so far as it affects both what the participant reveals to 
the researcher and their expectations about the nature of the analysis. The 
second signifying chain constitutes precisely this process of analysis and writing: 
the moves I make as I weave the conversation from the interview into the 
argument of my doctoral thesis. This is where a certain violence is done to the 
data, as some meanings are privileged in the substitution of linear text for the 
richness of the data, and the „supplanted signifiers‟, using Ragland-Sullivan‟s 
image, „fall‟ from the analysis back into field.  So, in the written analysis in my 
thesis, Duncan‟s words were used to support my objectification of literary studies 
as a multi-methodological discipline by demonstrating how, in the class on Benito 
Cereno: 
 
Duncan explicitly set out to present the two contrasting ways of reading as 
providing equally viable interpretations of the text. (Lapping, 2004, p. 183) 
 
The phrase „explicitly set out‟ rearticulates Duncan‟s reflections on his approach 
to „Benito Cereno‟ as a more direct concern with teaching than was perhaps 
evident in his words.   I did not, in contrast, explicitly rearticulate his more literary 
interest in developing „a more nuanced reading of Moby Dick’ within the thesis. 
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Arguably, this supplanted signifier remains in the „unconscious‟ of the project, 
and may return to haunt any ethical complacency on the part of the researcher. 
 
Laclau and Mouffe‟s logics of difference and equivalence may also be useful 
here, and may help to clarify a contrast between Hey‟s written analysis and my 
own. Hey‟s ethnographic account does not submerge the features of the 
differential identities of herself and her subjects, but incorporates their contrasting 
responses to the constraints of family and class. My account in my thesis said 
nothing about Duncan‟s literary interests. Thus Hey‟s hegemonising is closer to a 
logic of difference, while mine is, in comparison, closer to a logic of equivalence. 
The significance of an instance of „rapport‟, then, is not fixed within the field, but 
within the analysis.  
 
The constitution of a moment of „rapport‟ within a logic of either difference or 
equivalence may, then, be better understood as a retroactive effect of the chain 
of signifiers. Zizek provides a useful account of this retroactive production of 
meaning. He suggests that relationships within the ongoing flow of signfiers only 
become fixed when a particular signifier emerges as a centre, a nodal point, in 
relation to which the meaning of other signifiers can be stabilized. However, 
where this privileged signifier is going to emerge, and in what form, is historically 
contingent. Thus, „the effect of meaning is always produced backwards, apres 
coup‟: 
 
Signifiers which are still in a „floating‟ state – whose signification is not yet fixed – 
follow one another. Then, at a certain point – precisely the point at which the 
intention pierces the signifier‟s chain, traverses it – some signifier fixes 
retroactively the meaning of the chain, sews the meaning to the signifier halts the 
slide of meaning … [I]nstead of the linear, immanent, necessary progression 
according to which meaning unfolds itself from some initial kernel, we have a 
radically contingent process of retroactive production of meaning. (Zizek, 1989, 
pp. 101 – 102) 
 
There was a contingency to my interpretation of my interview with Duncan, and 
my analysis could have reinforced the positivity of his identity, as well as the 
positivity of the argument of my thesis. It was only my act of writing the 
interpretation that constituted, retrospectively, the point where „intention pierces 
the signifier‟s chain‟, halted the flow of signifiers, and retroactively constituted the 
meaning of the interaction, excluding the differential features of Duncan‟s 
position. There was a similar contingency to Hey‟s interpretation of the moments 
of recognition she describes from her fieldwork. The retroactive work of the 
signifying chain, and thus the establishment of signifiers as floating or fixed, is, to 
some extent, overdetermined by the existing discursive field, but within the micro-
contexts of academic research, the subjective intention of the researcher is a 
significant contingency.  
 
Fragment 2: metaphor and rupture in subjective identities 
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I am using a second extract from the same interview with Duncan to explore the 
structure of metaphor as a substitution that constructs an implicit comparison 
between subjects (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, p. 233). More specifically, I am going 
to interpret a series of interventions I made in the interview as substitutions 
connoting a shift in my subjective position from researcher, to participant, to 
educator. These shifts in my interventions, I will suggest, cover over a rupture 
within my own subjectivity and also in my relationship with Duncan, my research 
participant.  
 
The ambiguities in my position are apparent in the following exchange, where 
Duncan introduced the topic of group work: 
 
Duncan: … I do a lot of group work, as you know, because the classes are so big 
that it can be the only way to get everyone to actually do some work for 
themselves on the text on a particular issue. 
 
CL: And do you think that‟s one of the important parts of the seminar? 
 
Duncan: I do. I also have a bad conscience about it. I mean, people do just use 
group work when they‟re at the end of their tether, to be quite frank. Just because 
it takes the onus off them for ten minutes or so. And I do think I do it for that 
reason. I do think it can be very productive. That‟s a bad reason for doing it, I‟m 
saying this a lot this morning, there are good reasons for doing it as well, and the 
two do coincide and I think group work is a good idea. My problem with group 
work is that sometimes I think I‟m doing it too often, that there comes a moment 
in every seminar when I distribute a text and get people to work in groups on a 
particular problem. And it becomes a bit samey and a bit stereotyped, that 
everyone sort of feels the format is going to be the same each week. 
 
CL: Interesting. I found that when I was doing the groupwork that sometimes it 
depended on who you were working with and whether you had an idea you really 
wanted to talk about. So if I had something I wanted to say or somebody else did, 
that was great. I think once or twice I was with somebody else who didn‟t have so 
much to say. 
 
Duncan: Yes. I think it does depend a lot on the students‟ ability and their co-
operation. I mean there are some students in these classes who don‟t have the 
social skills or don‟t have the interest or haven‟t done the reading, and if you 
have any of those issues then it becomes very hard for them to talk. 
 
CL: I did find it mostly very productive. 
 
Duncan: Yes. Um. 
 
The change in my positioning within this exchange is significant. My first 
response is a fairly standard prompt to get Duncan to elaborate his thoughts on 
the topic. At this point my position can be uncomplicatedly identified as that of 
researcher, eliciting information from my participant. Duncan‟s elicited account 
foregrounds some of his doubts about his use of group-work, „sometimes I think 
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I‟m doing it too often‟, „it becomes a bit samey‟. This in turn prompted my own 
reflection on my experience of group-work in Duncan‟s classes, and I appeared 
to confirm his equivocal position, saying, „sometimes it depended on who you 
were working with … once or twice I was with somebody else who didn‟t have 
much to say‟. Here I seem to have shifted into a more embedded position, 
reflecting on my own responses as participant, rather than as researcher. My 
final comment was, as I remember it, an attempt to retrieve an apparent 
complicity in denigrating group-work, and thus, although poorly articulated, 
represents another shift in my position, from participant to educator, a 
professional with views on the effectiveness of certain teaching practices.  
 
What this account suggests is the discontinuities within my subjective position. 
My identifications as researcher, participant and educator pull me in different 
directions, but my articulation of these contrasting positions can be seen as a 
mechanism to unify, rather than repress, the conflicting fragments. Just as 
metaphor constitutes a relationship of association through the substitution of one 
word for another, the substitutions within my interventions here - of researcher, 
with participant, and finally with educator - can be seen as constructing an 
association between the conflicting aspects of my subjectivity, in an 
uncomfortable attempt to maintain all three within one coherent identity.  
 
This chain of metaphorical associations was initiated, perhaps, in our earlier 
conversations about Duncan‟s teaching. Of the tutors who took part in the 
research, Duncan was the one who most explicitly used our discussions to reflect 
on his practice. In our initial meeting, before I began my observations, he talked 
about some of his concerns: his awareness, he said, that he could learn 
strategies to improve his teaching; his ambition „to be the sort of teacher who 
knows all his students‟; and his frustrations that the large classes he was working 
with made this difficult. He also talked analytically about changes he had made to 
the American Literature module as a response to students‟ lack of background in 
the necessary history, which he did not dismiss as ignorance, but recognized as 
an understandable contingency: „why should they know it?‟ Duncan also 
described previous discussions that had helped him to reflect on his teaching: 
when he had felt frustrated at students‟ lack of interest in a particular text, for 
example, his mother had reminded him that he too had found the text dull when 
he had read it as an undergraduate. These references to his teaching, 
occasionally articulated as an explicit request for my views, as, perhaps, 
someone perceived to specialize in education, gave me the impression that 
Duncan interpreted my research as an opportunity to reflect on his own 
classroom practice. So it may be possible to interpret my final intervention as an 
attempt to fulfill the role that I interpreted Duncan as demanding: responding to 
his conception of the research as contributing to his development as a teacher by 
offering my (non) expert view on the productivity of group work. 
 
Thus we can trace a chain of signification from Duncan‟s reflections on his 
teaching to my disjointed interventions in the exchange about group work. The 
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metonymic connections between Duncan‟s expectations and my positioning as 
an educator cut across my more researcherly interventions, constituting an 
implicit comparison between the two roles that replicates the structure of 
metaphor.  Whether my projections of Duncan‟s expectations were accurate or 
not is in some sense irrelevant. What is more relevant is the extent to which the 
metaphorical substitution was able to evoke an association between researcher 
and educator either within the interview, or, potentially, later on, in the analysis.   
 
Within the interview Duncan‟s slightly imponderable response, „yes, um‟, 
suggests that, perhaps, my intervention had not evoked a considered, 
educationalist-like evaluation of the role of group work in his classes. However, 
the duality in my position can also be identified in the written analysis of the 
research.  I didn‟t explicitly analyse this part of our conversation within the thesis, 
but, perhaps in response to the exchange, I did insert a comment on the role of 
group-work in to the chapter on the American Literature classes: 
 
Small group work helps students to generate and experiment with ideas and also 
provides an opportunity for discussion for students who may not feel so 
comfortable speaking in front of the whole class. As a result, it inevitably has the 
effect of producing more positions, more time and more access to ideas, from 
which students can speak. (Lapping, 2004, p. 193) 
 
This objectifying claim, made as an aside, about the benefits of group work was 
based on my general experience as a teacher, rather than an academic expertise 
in the field of teaching and learning. It continues the uncomfortable attempt to 
unify contrasting subject positions, which has, I think, some ethical implications.  
 
The ambiguity over my identity, in this instance, may, initially, be seen as a logic 
of difference, recognizing and responding to Duncan‟s concern to reflect on his 
teaching, which connects, metonymically, with the part of my research that 
derives from an interest in teaching and inclusion. However, the introduction of 
my specific views on the role of group work and my attempt to impose this view 
can be seen as a logic of equivalence, a move to subsume the differential 
features of Duncan‟s position. Although in this case it seems likely that the 
metaphorical substitution failed to obliterate or exclude other signifiers, this kind 
of move may be felt as a violent or unexpected assault. It has parallels, I believe, 
with the imposition of any external interpretive frame in the analysis of data, 
though I am thinking particularly of my own analysis of gender through the frame 
of Lacanian theory (Lapping, 2004, 2006), and of the omissions this kind of 
analysis enacts. The metaphorical substitution of a perceived to be uncritical 
researcher in the field with a theoretically informed author in the process of 
analysis is one that introduces a variety of ethical quandaries.  
 
This example, then, illustrates both the interweaving of metonymic and 
metaphoric chains of signification within an interaction in the field, and also the 
way that metaphorical substitutions, in covering over gaps and discontinuities, 
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may enact ethically significant exclusions, obscuring aspects of the field and 
differential subjective features of research participants.  
 
Conclusions: interpretation, ethics and subjectivity 
The description of the production of meaning across the contexts of field, 
analysis and writing as working through the discursive mechanisms of metaphor 
and metonymy has several effects. Primarily it disrupts the boundaries of each of 
these settings, foregrounding traces and associations that reveal the 
interdependency and incompleteness of both embedded experience and 
analytical writing. The clarification of these interconnections, I have suggested, 
may also help us to take fuller account of the selections and omissions we 
produce, in our interactions with participants and also in the fixing of meanings 
within our writing. The consideration of written analysis in particular may draw our 
attention to the closing down of meanings inherent to academic argument.  
 
This article itself constitutes a signifier with Lacan‟s two modes of evocation.  Its 
metonymic logic identifies similarities between my own work and that of Hey, 
Laclau and Mouffe and Lacan. This is a small, hegemonising move that attempts 
to restructure the field of education studies around psychoanalytically informed 
approaches to analysis in social research. The theoretical argument within the 
paper, in contrast, acts metaphorically to displace the more embodied and 
emotional aspects of the process of writing, which I have, nevertheless, 
attempted to retain at moments within the text (and in the addendum). I suspect, 
though, that whatever we hope to achieve through the representation of these 
embodied experiences, the act of (academic) writing purifies them into, at best, 
self-congratulatory „reflexivity‟. The text also re-articulates some of the 
interdependencies between my PhD thesis and the field, revealing omissions and   
displacements enacted in the original analysis, thus acting as a retrospective 
logic of difference. Perhaps the analysis of these mechanisms within the text can 
help us to identify our own part in a variety of strategic games that have ethical 
and political connotations. 
 
The discussion also suggests ways in which the construction of meaning in field 
and analysis is analogous to verbal mechanisms of metaphor and metonymy. 
Instead of a word or image, fragments of conversations and written texts have 
been interpreted as working through similar discursive mechanisms in the 
production of meaning. This is not an original or, perhaps, a significant break 
from the original analysis of metaphor and metonymy within poetic or literary 
language, but it does replicate a shift from the application of these terms to 
describe words, sounds and images to a use closer to Laclau and Mouffe‟s 
political logics of equivalence and difference.  
 
As a final reflection, it seems possible to think of metaphor and metonymy as 
mechanisms for the production of misrecognitions. They cover over gaps in 
discourse, presenting an illusion of wholeness, both at the level of the signifying 
system as a whole, and at the level of individual meanings and identities. The 
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politics advocated by Laclau and Mouffe involves the disruption of these 
hegemonic misrecognitions, but also suggests that we make use of gaps within 
the symbolic in a radical political strategy that involves an active hegemonising of 
fields of discursivity. The tension between these two strategies evokes, again, 
the impossible tension Lacan describes within subjectivity:  
 
This signifying game between metonymy and metaphor, up to and including the 
active edge that splits my desire between a refusal of the signifier and a lack of 
being, and links my fate to the question of my destiny, this game, in all its 
inexorable subtlety, is played until the match is called, there where I am not, 
because I cannot situate myself there. (Lacan, 1989, p. 183) 
 
 
 
Addendum 
When I had finished my research I sent a summary to all my participants. For the 
tutors, I also included a contents list, suggesting that they should ask if they 
would like me to send them any of the chapters. One of the tutors did not 
respond, and, when I bumped in to her some months later, apologized for not 
having read what I had sent her. Another tutor e-mailed to suggest we meet to 
chat about some of the points I had raised, which we did, and had a useful 
discussion. The third tutor responded very quickly, saying he was disappointed 
by some of the things I had said about his discipline, and offered to clarify some 
points with me. He also requested that I send him a chapter, and when I had 
done so, expressing my interest in his views, did not respond again.  
  
Duncan was the most enthusiastic in his initial response to the summary.  He e-
mailed to say he thought it looked like an excellent thesis, and mentioned several 
points that he had thought particularly interesting. He also asked me to send him 
the chapter dealing with the American Literature classes. I was uncomfortable 
about sending the chapter, because I was aware that it included some 
interpretations of Duncan‟s practice that he might perceive as professionally or 
personally critical.  Nevertheless, I sent the chapter, along with a badly worded e-
mail that, instead of explaining the possibility that he might not like what I had 
produced, simply re-asserted my admiration of his teaching. Duncan responded, 
thanking me for my compliments, and saying he would certainly read the chapter, 
when he was a little less busy, and that was sure he would have some comments 
when he had. He finished by saying he would be happy to help me again at some 
point in the future. I did not hear from him. 
 
The silence from both of the participants who read chapters of the thesis is, in the 
scariest sense, imponderable. It raises serious ethical questions about the 
responsibility that we take on when we recontextualise participants‟ practice into 
the framework of our research. Our interpretations set up new chains of 
signification that have complicated and unpredictable ethical, emotional and 
political effects.  
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